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CALENDAR MARKETING
AGREEMENTS: HOW MUCH LONGER
TILL THE SODA SPILLS?
As far back as the seventeenth century courts expressed an in-
terest in protecting free trade among the members of society.'
With the onset of the nineteenth century and the advancement of
industrialization, Congress deemed it necessary to protect this in-
terest through the enactment of a law' that preserved free and
unfettered competition: The Sherman Antitrust Act (the Act).'
See Darcy v. Allen, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602); Colgate v. Bacheler, 78 Eng. Rep.
1097 (K.B. 1601); Davenant v. Hurdis, 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1599). See also United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898) (Judge Taft stated that
from early times it was England's policy to discourage unreasonable restraints of trade),
modified and affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 1.3, at 8-9
(1980) (summary of non-intervention or "laissez faire" economics).
' See 1 H. TOULMIN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES §
4.1, at 93 (1949 & Supp. 1980). Following the Civil War, competitors began to enter into
combinations and agreements which were highly profitable but stifling to economic compe-
tition. Id. Over-production and rapid deflation impelled some worried merchants to enter
into combinations to restrict production. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business
Competition, 36 YALE L.J. 207, 213-19 (1926). These combinations and agreements arose in
the form of trusts, thereby creating the phrase "antitrust". See Best, The Antitrust Contro-
versy-A Survey, 17 Bus. LAW. 859, 860 (1962). Trusts were organized by retaining share-
holders from rival companies who would transfer their shares to trustees who acquired the
authority to regulate them. 1 H. TOULMIN JR., supra, § 4.4, at 95. This authority, granted
to trustees, empowered them to control and manipulate the participating companies. Id.
These trusts and other anticompetitive arrangements were negatively viewed due to their
enormous size and economic power. See 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 1, § 4.2, at 129 (1980).
An example of such an anticompetitive agreement was the Standard Oil Company trust.
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 34 (1911). The trust, developed by the
Standard Oil Company, was an agreement which detailed the procedure for controlling
and administering jointly held property. Id. at 35-36. The purpose of this trust agreement
was to fix oil prices, restrict oil production and govern the transportation of all manufac-
tured oil. Id. at 32. "In effect, the oil industry in the United States became concentrated in
the hands of nine trustees." Id.
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
Section one of the Sherman Act states in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. § 1 (West Supp. 1988).
Furthermore, section two of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . I..." Id. § 2.
Fueled by the economic depression of the 1870's and 1880's, there was a great public
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The purpose of the Act was to protect free competition and pro-
mote economic efficiency.' As stated in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States:5 "The Sherman Act was designed to be a compre-
hensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition . . .. the [resulting] unrestrained interac-
tion of competitive forces ...yielding the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress .. ..*", Since passage of the Act in
1890, courts have held various arrangements and agreements de-
void of competitive value. Several forms of conduct found to be
illegal under the Act include horizontal price fixing,7 horizontal
outcry for a federal statute to demolish the power of trusts. See C. ANDERSON HILLS, ANTI-
TRUST ADVISER 4 (3d ed. 1985). The passage of the Sherman Act was viewed as a "good-
faith effort" to restrain the "uncontrolled power of the trusts." See M. HOFFMANN & A.
WINARD, 1 HOFFMANN'S ANTITRUST LAW AND TECHNIQUES 5 (1963). See also Letwin, Congress
and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 235 (1956) (trusts blamed
for almost everything from bribed civil servants to unemployment). See generally 1 H. TOUL-
MIN, JR., supra note 2, § 1.17-.18, at 21-22 (discussing legislative history of Sherman Act).
' See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (purpose of Sherman
Act was to maintain "free and unfettered competition"); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340
U.S. 231, 249 (1951) ("Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought to protect,
and monopoly, which it sought to prevent." (quoting A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 135
F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943))); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,
359 (1933) (aim of Sherman Act to "prevent undue restraints of interstate commerce, to
maintain its appropriate freedom in the public interest, to afford protection from the sub-
versive or coercive influences of monopolistic endeavor"); Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 50.
The Court stated that the primary impetus for passage of the Sherman Act was to prevent
"the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals, the enor-
mous development of corporate organization, the facility for combination which such orga-
nizations afforded, . . . and the widespread impression that their power had been and
would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally." Id.; see also D.
ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY 9 (1986) (competition permits most efficient firms to sur-
vive, thereby allowing consumer opportunity to purchase a better product); L. SULLIVAN,
ANTITRUST 20 (1977) (purpose of antitrust laws is to preserve competition); I H. TOULMIN,
JR., supra note 2, § 4.4, at 96 (preserving freedom of competition purpose of Sherman
Act). See Best, supra note 2, at 860. Uninhibited competition will result in the most benefi-
cial allotment of economic assets while maintaining "democratic, political and social institu-
tions." Id. Another function related to the preservation of free competition is the promo-
tion of consumer welfare. See generally R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX - A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF 61-69 (1978) (competition permits consumer to reap benefits of paying
lower prices for products and allows flexibility in choosing suppliers).
356 U.S. 1 (1958)
SId. at 4.
' See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (even if price fixed is
reasonable, it is illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940)
(held any combination which interferes with or alters market price illegal); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 342 (1897) (pricing agreement among mem-
bers of railroad combination held illegal); see also R. GIVENS, ANTITRUST: AN ECONOMIC AP-
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division of territories,8 group boycotts,9 monopolization and at-
tempts to monopolize.10 In recent years, courts have had to assess
the validity of arrangements both novel in form and spanning a
broad spectrum of commercial activity.11 In the soft drink indus-
try, one type of agreement which is of questionable validity is the
Calendar Marketing Agreement (CMA).1
PROACH § 7.01, at 7-1 to 7-12 (1983 & Supp. 1988). See generally Hay & Kelly, An Empirical
Study of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. ECON. 13 (1974) (analysis of price fixing violations);
Peppin, Price-Fixing Agreements Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 667
(1970) (same).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1972) (arrangement
between parties to protect territories from competitors held illegal), affd, 414 U.S. 801
(1973); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951) (territo-
rial division of market is only one of an "aggregation of trade restraints"); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291-92 (6th Cir. 1898) (court condemned arrange-
ment by which defendants divided territory among themselves), modifid and af'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899); cf United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 575 (2d Cir.
1961) (horizontal division of customers among competitors held per se illegal).
' See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966) (economic
motivation for concerted action to deprive competitors access to market is unimportant);
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914)
(held boycott by retailers of their wholesalers violated antitrust laws); Southway Theatres,
Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 492 n.6 (5th Cir. 1982) (distributors refusal to
deal with theatre held group boycott). But see generally Note, Barry v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co.: A Reinterpretation of the Boycott Exception to the McCarran Act, 1977
DUKE L.J. 1069 (certain group refusals to deal are outside the meaning of boycott based
upon non-coercive form of activity).
10 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (monopolization in-
cludes both ability to form monopoly and intent to form monopoly); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1965) (attempt to monopolize requires three factors: specific
intent, overt act, dangerous probability of successful monopolization). See also 3 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICA-
TION 831-36 (1978); L. SULLIVAN Supra note 4, at 134-40 (1977).
" See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982) (medical
society's agreement setting maximum claim fees held illegal); Catalano, Inc. v. Target
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (beverage wholesalers' agreement to eliminate credit
provided to retailers held illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
223-24 (1940) (petroleum corporation's agreement to set prices found illegal).
A sample "letter of agreement" and pertinent sections contain:
[X Corp.] agrees to participate in the 19[ ] Business Program .... at a level of 26
weeks (per attached calendar) for payment of [ ]. Promotional calendar payment to
be made on . . . quarterly dates .... [X Corp.] in consideration of the above ...
agrees to the following program elements:
(1) Specific ad calendar.
(2) Promotion shall be exclusive 7-day ad feature.
(3) Price shall be reduced to feature retail level.
(4) Price shall be communicated to the consumer with ad feature in regular method
of advertisement, shelf talkers, and display sheets.
(5) Promotional package(s) shall be supported with display in main traffic pattern,
including all promoted brands and racks do not qualify as displays.
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I. FORM OF THE AGREEMENT
A Calendar Marketing Agreement is a contract between a man-
ufacturer - in this case a soft drink bottler - and a retailer, in
which the soft drink bottler pays the retailer a substantial amount
of money in exchange for preferential treatment.' s The compen-
sation paid to retailers has ranged from a low of several thousand
dollars to nearly three-quarters of a million dollars. 4 Preferential
treatment afforded the soft drink bottler's product includes exclu-
sive advertising, 5 prime shelf space,' 6 and a retail price below
(6) Package exlusivity on primary ad feature.
(7) Program elements will be communicated by chain headquarters to store level
management and individual store non-performance will reduce the total payments..
18 See Scott, RC Doubles Budget Behind New Spots, ADWEEK, Nov. 16, 1987, at 22 (eastern
ed.).
Bottlers are critical in the beverage arena because they manufacture and package the
products and thereafter determine to which retail stores they will sell. See E. MCCARTHY, J.
GRASHOF & A. BROGOWIcz, READINGS AND CASES IN BASIC MARKETING 220 (4th ed. 1984).
Therefore, the success of a product in sales, as well as profits, is dependent on the bottler
who arbitrates "what goes on in the trenches, at the point of sale." See What's Brewing for
Soft Drinks in 1987, BEVERAGE WORLD, Jan. 1987, at 22, 25 (quoting Emanuel Goldman,
partner in California securities firm). Furthermore, the bottler has the power to set prices,
and unless the retailer has a deal or allowance, he must absorb the loss. See Blair, Adapt or
Perish?, BEVERAGE WORLD, Oct. 1987, at 54, 60 (quoting William J. Vitulli, Vice President
of Government and Community Relations for the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Com-
pany). See also Beverage Management, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144,
1152-53 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (CMA provides retailer with opportunity to earn bonus based on
sales volume).
Although there is a federal antitrust statute concerning the soft drink industry, Pub. L.
No. 96-308, 94 Stat. 939 (1986), the "Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act" clarifies the
legality of licensing provisions but does not encompass the use of CMAs. See generally Note,
The Real Thing: Special Antitrust Treatment for the Soft Drink Industry, 30 CATm. U.L. REV. 131
(1980) (discusses history and purpose of "Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act").
14 See 60 Minutes: Cola Payola (CBS Television Broadcast, Oct. 25, 1987) (Coca-Cola
agreed to pay a total of $310,000 for full year CMA) [hereinafter 60 Minutes]; Waldon,
Sharpening the Edge, ARKANSAS Bus., Mar. 14, 1988, at 18 (CMA payments vary depending
upon whether brand is advertised during holiday weekend, payday week, consecutive weeks
and percentage increase in sales over past year); Bronson, The Soda Wars-A Report from the
Battlefront, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 8, 1985, at 58-59 (small soft drink bottler
charged that a local food chain was offered over $700,000 by Coca-Cola Bottling Corp. for
marketing plan which included provision for exclusive advertising).
15 See Beverage Management, 653 F. Supp. at 1146. In order to receive bonus money pur-
suant to a CMA, Coca-Cola must be the exclusive feature ad among directly competing
national brands. Id. The retailer was required to run a specific number of promotions. Id.
Plaintiff sued the soft drink distributor for loss in sales because of an inability to obtain
feature advertising. Id. at 1147. But see Waldon, supra note 14, at 18 (some CMAs do not
contain exclusivity provisions, leaving other brands free to feature advertise).
"e Lawrence, Cola Wars Move In Stores, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 9, 1987, at 4. CMAs re-
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other soft drinks being offered." Typically, a CMA ranges from
one to fifty-two weeks. However, most are for a twenty-six week
period with the remaining twenty-six weeks being reserved for a
competing bottler.18 Although retailers may accept or reject these
agreements,19 in most cases they have been persuaded to accept
due to extraneous economic pressure, i.e., lucrative monetary pay-
ments.2 0 For the manufacturer, CMAs result in its product retain-
ing the lowest price in that specific market, maintaining high visi-
bility, and achieving an increase in sales volume with a potential
for increased market share.2
quire a specific amount of preferential shelf space be given to the major brands. Id. See
Waldon, supra note 14, at 16. The CMA required that Coca-Cola be the exclusively adver-
tised soft drink and have at least 60% of all natural soft drink space. Id. See also Dennis,
Coke and Pepsi Stomp on the Little Guys, FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985, at 67-68 (shelf space is di-
vided by market share: -Pretty soon Coke & Pepsi are going to squeeze everyone else out
In recent years, some small distributors have been afraid to sue the large distributors
because of possible ramifications with respect to their shelf space. Id. The small distributor
is afraid the retailer may get upset and "wipe him out by slowly reallocating shelf space to
other brands." Id. See generally 60 Minutes, supra note 14 (discussing application and trade-
offs of CMAs).
" See Sun-Drop Bottling v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 604 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (W.D.N.C.
1985) (CMA required Coca-Cola's product to be only soft drink with reduced price); see
also Mason, The World's Oldest War? Try Colas Coke v. Pepsi, THE Bus. J. CHARLOTTE, Apr.
11, 1988, at 3 (Pepsi must lower its price to retailers with CMAs in order to compete with
Coke; Waldon, supra note 14, at 14 (cash incentive payment in CMA is in exchange for
lowest price guarantee); cf. Beverage Management, 653 F. Supp. at 1146-47 (bottlers offer
volume incentive rebates that often decrease cost to consumers).
" See, e.g., Beverage Management, Inc. v. Coca Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144,-
1146 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (CMA was for 52-week period); 60 Minutes, supra note 14 (Coke
gets a 26 week CMA, Pepsi gets other 26 weeks). See also Lawrence, supra note 16, at 4.
"CMAs determine during a given period - from 12 to 26, and even 52, weeks - which
of the two soft drinks will be promoted in retailer newspaper ads." Id.
" See Beverage Management, 653 F. Supp. at 1466. The retailer was "free to take advan-
tage of the promotional offer or to not do so as it chooses." Id.; Waldon, supra note 14, at
17. "A CMA doesn't make you participate.., you have a choice." Id. (quoting Tom Jame-
son, promotional analyst for Safeway Stores).
2' See Beverage Management, 653 F. Supp. at 1153 (lucrative terms of CMAs bring im-
proper pressure on retailers to accept); 60 Minutes, supra note 14 (large monetary payments
used to promote feature ad price); Waldon, supra note 14, at 17. Because of the large sums
of money given, if you're offered a CMA, you take it. Id.
II See Defendant's Opening Brief at 1, Sun-Drop Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Botting Co.,
604 F. Supp. 1197 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (No. C-C-84-513-M) [hereinafter. Defendant's Sun-Drop
Brief]. Interbrand competition between bottlers who use CMAs will provide high output
and low prices. Id. See, e.g. Kelly & Ticer, The Uncola Company Gives Bottlers A Friendly Pep-
per - Upper, Bus. WK., Feb. 8, 1988, at 94 (year after year, sales volume and market share of
major bottlers increases); Farlander & Oman, Tuning in the Retail Channel, BEVERAGE
WORLD, Oct. 1987 (promotional pricing provides lower prices for consumers, almost 80%
of soda beverages are discounted); Landphair, Soft-Drink Firms in Bloody Fight For Shelf
125
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In recent years, various bottling subsidiaries of the Coca-Cola
Corporation and PepsiCo, the makers of "Coke" and "Pepsi" re-
spectively, have initiated CMAs in various geographic regions
throughout the country.2 Most often these agreements exist back
to back thereby leaving little, if any, calendar space for smaller
bottlers to achieve the various benefits of CMAs.
Due to their increasing economic power, coupled with a com-
bined market share of over seventy percent, these soft drink gi-
ants remain the only two corporations with the structural and eco-
nomic power capable of enticing retailers into CMAs.2 s Although
the next largest soft drink bottler (Dr. Pepper) could attempt to
establish an effective CMA, it is unlikely that a company with a
market share only slightly exceeding five percent would be even
Space, NEW ORLEANS Bus., Feb. 24, 1986, at 15 (with coupons a 99 cent item costs only 39
cents in soda industry). But see United States v. Allegheny Bottling, No. 87-123-N (E.D. Va.
Sept. 9, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file) (although promotional price was lowest
in market, defendants still fixed price above free market gauge in violation of Sherman
Act).
" See Beverage Management, 653 F. Supp. at 1153 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (lawsuit based on
CMA's possible violation of antitrust law); Sun-Drop Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 604 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (same). See also 60 Minutes, supra note 14
(discussing increase in number of CMAs in soda industry); Lawrence, supra note 16, at 4
(hot topic in beverage industry is increase in CMAs); Waldon, supra note 14, at 17 (decade
ago CMAs numbered ten, today almost ninety).
'3 See Kelly & Ticer, supra note 21, at 94. Coca-Cola maintained 39.9% of the market
share in 1986 and increased its market share to 40.3% in 1987. Id. Pepsi had 29.8% of the
market share in 1986 and increased its market share to 30.2% in 1987. Id. Dr. Pepper, in
1986, had only 5.3% of the market share with an increase of only .1% in 1987. Id. Seven-
Up also had a slight increase in market share in 1987 from 5.1% to 5.3%. Id. Royal Crown,
however, lost .2% of the market share from 3.1% to 2.9%. Id. See also Soft Drinks, BEVERAGE
WORLD, Apr. 1987, at 16 (financial status of Coke and Pepsi); Williams, Soft Drink Wars: The
Next Battle, FORTUNE, June 24, 1985, at 70-71 "[One percent] of the market is worth $300
million in retail sales .... " Id.; see E. MCCARThY, J. GRASHOF & A. BROGOWICZ, supra note
13, at 219-27. "Companies without the financial resources of Coke and Pepsi will find
themselves off the bottlers' minds and off retailers' shelves." Id. at 220; Bronson, supra
note 14, at 59. (Coke and Pepsi pay for supermarket "shelf space - a cost that few bottlers
of smaller brands can bear."); Powell, Shannon & Underwood, Cola Mergers Lose Some Fizz,
NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1986, at 48 (smaller bottlers cannot compete with intense marketing
power that Coke and Pepsi possess); Stevenson, Other Sodas Caught in Coke-Pepsi War, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 24, 1986, at DI, col. 2 (according to prediction of analysts and industry execu-
tives, smaller companies will find it difficult to offer expensive price promotions and image
building advertising which Pepsi and Coke offer).
The fact that major bottlers have significant market control does not give them the right
to use their position "as leverage to deprive competitors of access to customers, to force
customers to maintain ... prices .... See Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp.,
567 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
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moderately successful. 4 At first blush, this type of activity may ap-
pear to be anticompetitive, but both sides of the issue must be
examined.
A. Procompetitive Aspects
The purpose of antitrust law is to promote the unrestrained in-
teraction of competitive forces in order to achieve the lowest price
with the highest quality product.2 5 Thus, it has been contended
that CMAs are justified by virtue of the following: CMAs permit
consumers to obtain both the lowest priced and highest quality
product, thereby increasing consumer demand while keeping sup-
ply at an abundant level .2  Additionally, they allow the retailer to
reap financial benefit through increased sales and the establish-
ment of goodwill.27 Furthermore, manufacturers advocate the sur-
" See Mason, supra note 17, at 3. "The cola giant can afford to spend money on calen-
dar marketing agreements. Smaller bottlers can't. We don't have that kind of money." Id.
(quoting Joseph Serio, President of Allbev Inc., bottlers of Royal Crown Cola and Seven-
Up products); Waldon, supra note 14, at 15. CMAs are preventing companies such as
Seven-Up from reaching the consumer equally with Coke & Pepsi. Id.; Lawrence, supra
note 16, at 5. "We can't compete against CMAs, and we don't try to." Id. (quoting Bob
O'Brien, Vice President of Big Red Co., a regional soda distributor).
, See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. See also Sun-Drop Bottling Co., 604 F. Supp.
at 1200. "The public has an interest in preventing and punishing such violations of the
anti-trust laws as restrictive market practices ... [hiowever, this must be balanced against
the public interest in non-interference with legitimate market activities." Id.
1' See Defendant's Sun-Drop Brief, supra note 21, at 10. CMAs are procompetitive in
nature due to their aggressive character and therefore further the purpose of antitrust law.
Id. CMAs afford consumers lower prices because all bottlers are induced to sell at the same
low price to retain a market share. Id. This type of competition allows the retailer freedom
as to whose CMA he will accept and for what price he will ultimately sell the product. Id. at
25. "[T]he great intensity of the interbrand competition between bottlers of Coca-Cola and
bottlers of Pepsi ensures that output will continue to be high and that prices will continue
to be low." Id. at 38. See also R. ENRICO, THE OTHER Guy BLINKED (1986). The author,
President of Pepsi-Cola, stated that "the battles between Pepsi and Coke have been very
good . .. for consumers; the retail price per ounce of our soft drinks is as low today as it
was ten years ago." Id. at 268. See also FARLANDER & OMAN, supra note 21, at 32 (due to
promotions, consumers can still buy Coke at five-cents-a-glass); Worthy, Coke and Pepsi
Stomp on the Little Guys, FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985 at 68 (competition between bottlers yields
lower prices for consumer).
27 See Beverage Management, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144,
1152-53 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (as sales increase retailers earn more income thereby increasing
profit); Defendant's Sun-Drop Brief, supra note 21, at 41. Retailers benefit from CMAs
because they "draw[ ] shoppers into participating retail stores, thereby enhancing the re-
tailer's ability to compete for the consumer's overall grocery needs." Id. Furthermore,
"[r]etailers prefer [Coke]'s products ... for promotional activity because [their] products
attract customers to the store while [others] do not." Id. at 40.
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vival of the fittest theory in claiming that CMAs promote the
long-run benefit of an optimal efficiency market wherein bever-
ages with the strongest consumer preference will survive."'
B. Anticompetitive Aspects
However, CMAs may not provide the most efficient, least harm-
ful mechanism for achieving the benefits previously stated. Al-
though they can provide a financial benefit to consumers,29 CMAs
do not cause consumers to purchase according to brand loyalty or
quality of product.30 Rather, they merely encourage the consumer
to purchase the product most readily visible;" such visibility being
the product of an expensive advertising arrangement into which
only the largest of bottlers can afford to enter.
Thus, despite the benefits that CMAs might afford, their legal-
ity under the antitrust laws requires examination.3 2 This article
will set forth an analysis of Calendar Marketing Agreements
under several antitrust theories including horizontal price fixing,
vertical price fixing, group boycotts, and the essential facilities
" See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I at 16, Beverage Management (No. C-1-84-
1300) [hereinafter Defendant Beverage Motion]. Coke argued that other soft drink bottlers
who were unsuccessful in their usage of CMAs are trying to prevent their use by those who
are successful with them. Id. at 15. The purpose of a competitive market is to reward the
best product. Id. at 16. See also Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 429 (1966) (anticompetitive activities such as price
fixing or market division "may create efficiencies valuable to consumers").
" See supra note 17.
50 See Williams, The No-Win Game of Price Promotion, FORTUNE, July 11, 1983, at 92, 102
(author suggests that trade promotions influence consumers to buy for price and not
brand). Responding to criticism of CMAs, Coke argues that "there is no conspiracy alleged
... no illegal agreement alleged ... [and] no allegations of improper pressure brought to
bear upon the retailers by the defendant." Id. See also Defendant Beverage Motion, supra
note 28, at 17. Coke further contends that without these factors there can be no "illegal
antitrust activity." Id. at 17-18. See generally R. ENRICO, supra note 26, at 267 (President of
Pepsi emphasizes the characteristic competitiveness of soft drink industry).
11 See FARLANDER & OMAN, supra note 21, at 32. "Consumer brand loyalty has reached
an all-time low as shoppers have become pre-conditioned to purchase the best weekly soft
drink value." Id.
" See generally Beverage Management Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp.
1144 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (soft drink bottler brought action alleging that competitor's CMA
violated antitrust law, preliminary injunction for bottler was denied); Sun-Drop Bottling
Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 604 F. Supp. 1197 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (preliminary injunction
restraining defendants CMA denied, question of validity of CMA remained unanswered);
Scott, Harralson Bubbles With Optimism; Royal Crown's Chief Vows to Double Ad Spending, AD-
WEEK (southeast ed.) Nov. 23, 1987 (CMAs are beneficial to extent they are legal).
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doctrine. In order to provide a better background for analysis of
the substantive principles of antitrust law, it first becomes neces-
sary to discuss the goals of the Sherman Act.
II. BACKGROUND GOALS OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
As Robert Bork aptly notes, "antitrust is a cornucopia of social
values, all of them rather vague and undefined but infinitely at-
tractive."88 The Sherman Act has an adaptability comparable to
that of constitutional provisions, yet its purpose to promote free
and unfettered competition remains the standard against which all
activity is examined. Although the words are simple, the complex-
ity of its interpretation has stirred much debate over the course of
its history.
A. Sections One & Two
To establish a violation of section one of the Sherman Act34 a
plaintiff is required to prove that two separate entities engaged in
a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce" and that such restraint was unreasonable. 5 The
phrase "contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy" has been suc-
cinctly stated as a "concerted action." ' A concerted action is es-
33 See R. BORK, supra note 4, at 50.
" Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. See supra notes 3-4.
See Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 763 F.2d 604, 610 n.10
(4th Cir. 1985) (court stated plaintiff must show conspiracy, and (1) that conspiracy created
negative effects; (2) that it was illegal; and (3) that injury resulted.). If competitors agree to
comply with a plan which will result in a restraint of trade, that behavior is adequate to
verify an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act. See Ball v. Paramount Pictures, 169
F.2d 317, 319 (3d Cir. 1948). See also Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d
1190, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1982) (defining plaintiffs burden to prove section one violation),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984); Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139,
147 (3d Cir. 1981) (court enumerated requirements for plaintiff to sustain section one vio-
lation), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982).
36 United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969). See Bogosian
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1977) (language of Sherman Act section
one described as single concept regarding common action; " 'contract . . . combination or
conspiracy' becomes an alliterative compound noun, roughly translated to mean 'concerted
action.' " (quoting L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTrrusT 312 (1977))), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978); Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980) (same), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
In order to establish the existence of a conspiracy, the Supreme Court stressed the neces-
sity of action involving more than one party. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) ("Independent action is not proscribed."); Tripoli Co. v. Wella
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tablished upon the showing of proof that a defendant engaged or
attempted to engage in this form of anticompetitive behavior.3 "
Furthermore, this concerted activity must impose a restraint on
trade "in" or "in the flow of" interstate commerce. 8 Section two
of the Act 9 was intended to supplement section one so as to safe-
Corp., 286 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (unilateral action cannot violate section one),
affd, 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
The classic definition of conspiracy is a "unity of purpose or a common design and un-
derstanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement ...." American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946). See Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-
Teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1074 (7th Cir. 1981) (it is unlawful conduct where
parties consciously participate in a common scheme or design via express or implied agree-
ment), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029 (1985); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's Inc.,
150 F.2d 738, 743 (3d Cir. 1945) (unlawful conspiracy does not require conspirators to act
simultaneously or via agreement (quoting Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S.
208, 225, 227 (1939))).
11 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-97 (1986) (dicta)
(if parties had "no rational economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent
with other equally plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of
conspiracy."); Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (plaintiff should proffer evidence showing defend-
ant "'had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful
objective'" (quoting Sweeney & Sons Inc., 637 F.2d at 111.)); United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948) (specific intent may be sufficient to find unlawful activ-
ity); National Marine Elec. Distrib. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190, 192 (4th Cir. 1985)
(evidence deemed insufficient to amount to conspiracy without common scheme between
dealers).
In order to determine if there is "concerted action" the evidence must be evaluated as a
whole. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962) (cannot judge
conspiracy by "'dismembering [evidence] and viewing its separate parts .... " (quoting
United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913)); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206
(1904) (acts may be lawful in themselves but result in unlawful conspiracy); Phillips v.
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 625 (4th Cir. 1979) (individual aspects of
proof are insignificant if viewed as whole do not establish conspiracy), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1074 (1980).
" See Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321-22 (1967) (activity substantially affected com-
merce); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940) (price fixing
conspiracy is per se violative of Sherman Act); see, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 783-84 (1975) (title examination held to be an integral part of an interstate
transaction); see also Thomas v. Petro-Wash, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 808, 814 (M.D.N.C. 1977)
(to plead valid cause of action plaintiff must show conduct in question has adverse effect on
interstate market (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 202 (1974)));
United States v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Tex., 427 F.2d 969, 974 (10th Cir.) ("indictment need
only charge that a combination was formed to fix prices on goods traveling interstate and
that it had that effect or contributed to thatend") (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
829 (1970). Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("essentially
local" nature of legal services are beyond Sherman Act). Furthermore, the interstate com-
merce requirement must be established in some substantial interaction and not by trivial
contact. See Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 739-40
(1976).
39 15 U.S.C. § 2 (West Supp. 1988).
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guard that by no possible guise could the intention of section one
be frustrated."' Further, section two sought to promote competi-
tion in the markets by preventing large aggregations of economic
might from being formed or administered unfairly."1 Section two
of the Act provides that: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations shall be
deemed guilty of a felony .... ",42 Thus, section two prohibits
three distinct offenses: actual monopolization, attempts to monop-
olize, and combinations and conspiracies to monopolize. 3 To es-
tablish monopolization there must be shown a conscious effort on
behalf of an entity to obtain an exclusive right of monopoly power
in a "relevant market."" Therefore, the attainment of monopoly
40 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). "A consideration of the text
of the 2d section serves to establish that it was intended to supplement the 1st and to make
sure that by no possible guise could the public policy embodied in the 1st section be frus-
trated or evaded." Id. This does not mean that a defendant cannot be convicted of violat-
ing more than one section of the Sherman Act. See American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 787-88 (1976) (defendants convicted of both section one and section
two violations of Sherman Act).
41 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386 (1956). See United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250-52 (1968) (willful maintenance of
monopoly power should be diffused by power of injunction).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (West Supp. 1988).
4 See E.L duPont de Nenours & Co., 351 U.S. at 391 (monopoly power will foreclose
competition); Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillion Cos., 783 F.2d 159, 164 (10th Cir.
1986) (monopoly power is "ability to control prices and exclude competition") (emphasis in
original); Betaseed Inc. v. U and I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1231 (9th Cir. 1982) (monopoly
power is that which "control[s] prices or exclude[s] competition ...."). Areeda, Symposium:
Anticipating Antitrust's Centennial: Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and
the Future, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 960 (1987) ("definition of monopoly power has proved
elusive" but state cases define it as "power to exclude competition or to control price"). See
generally R. BLAIR & D. KASSERMAN, ANTITRusT ECONOMIcS 25-68 (1985) (economic analysis
of monopoly and legislative response to such activities); Spivack, Monopolization Under the
Sherman Act, Section Two, 50 ANTrrRUST L.J. 285 (1982) (overview of monopolies).
" United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The Supreme Court
recognized the two elements of a section two offense: "(1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, busi-
ness acumen, or historic accident." Id. See Ladd, The Efficiency Defense: Section Two Limits on
Monopolistic Conduct After Aspen, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1712, 1713 (1986) (elements of section
two violations are "possession of monopoly power in the relevant market" and the mainte-
nance thereof). The relevant market is the "area of effective competition" where the de-
fendant governs his business. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 300 n. 5
(1949). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962) (must take
realistic, factual formulation to define relevant market rather than "formal, legalistic
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through aggressive merchandising and vigorous but honest eco-
nomic maneuvers is not by these facts condemned."5 What is con-
demned is the designed growth of the business for the purpose of
impeding a new company's entry, or excluding established compa-
nies whose presence is already precarious."
IV. CALANDAR MARKETING AGREEMENTS AS SUBSTANTIVE
VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Horizontal Price Fixing
No area of antitrust law has encountered as much litigation as
that of price fixing under section one of the Sherman Act.4 Hori-
zontal price fixing exists where there are agreements between two
or more independent entities which engage in competition on the
same plane of product or service distribution, and who agree on a
price or price range to be charged." In United States v. Socony-
one"); Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1117-18 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(relevant market determined in light of present facts and realities), affd, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978).
Generally, relevant market is defined in terms of product market. See E.L duPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 404 (relevant market defined according to particular commod-
ity being evaluated); See also Superturf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275, 1277 (8th
Cir. 1981) (relevant market composed of items "'reasonably interchangeable'" by pur-
chasers for same application (quoting United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 395 (1955))); cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)
(to determine relevant market fact finder must determine where seller operates as well as
availability of other like products in that area); Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 299 (look to
geographical market in determining effect on competition). For an analysis of what consti-
tutes the "product market" and "geographic market" see generally H. Hovencamp & Sil-
ver-Westrick, Predatory Pricing and the Ninth Circuit, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 443.
" See Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 718 (D. Haw.
1964), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969). "The Sherman Act does not make mere size nor
continued exercise of ... lawful power an offense, when that size and power have been
obtained by lawful means and developed by natural growth - absent the manifest purpose or
intent to exclude competition." Id. (emphasis in original).
6 Id. "The indicia of continued monopolization are the existence of either the power or
the intent to exclude competition or fix prices." Id.
"" See Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule - Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw.
UL. REV. 137 (1962) (price fixing is most frequent antitrust violation). See generally L. SUL-
LIVAN, supra note 4, at 10-25 (discussing price fixing from inception to modern times).
" See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (per curiam) (agree-
ment among wholesalers to eliminate credit terms held per se illegal). See also 1 R.
CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4.35, at 221
(L. Altman 4th ed. 1981) (horizontal pricing agreements serve only to stop competition);
Note, Motion Picture Split Agreements: An Antitrust Analysis, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 159, 175
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Vacuum Oil Co.," the Supreme Court provided a broad definition
of price fixing: "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed
for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce is illegal per se."50
The per se standard developed by the judiciary holds that cer-
tain restraints on trade are so pernicious as to be inherently an-
ticompetitive, needing no inquiry into their detrimental economic
impact.5' Thus, the per se standard is evidentiary in nature, and
(1983) (defining horizontal price fixing).
Conduct which constitutes this type of price fixing is determined by looking to agree-
ments between competitors aimed at controlling market prices. See, e.g., Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982) (agreement by members of medi-
cal society that set maximum claim fees for services held illegal per se); Catalano, 446 U.S.
at 650 (1980) (beer wholesalers' agreements to eliminate short-term credit given to retail-
ers held illegal per se); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 154 (1948)
(formula agreements which reduce potential to bid for films and which acquire all purchas-
ing power are illegal restraints of trade).
" 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
5 Id. at 233.
" See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (seminal case
declaring anticompetitive agreement unreasonable and unlawful). See also United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("Under the Sherman Act a combina-
tion formed for the purpose and with the effect of [changing] ... the price of a commodity
in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se"); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911). Without employing the term per se the Court held
that "agreements ... having for their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the
fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and void." Id.; cf. Beschle, "What Never?
Well, Hardly Ever": Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 471, 477-96 (1987) (discussing creation and development of per se rules);
Comment, Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.: The Justice Department Challenges the
Per Se Rule Against Resale Price Maintenance, 46 U. P-rr. L. REV. 171, 172-75 (1984) (analyz-
ing historical background of per se rule).
Per se violations are deemed illegal without consideration of their effect or justification.
See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
See Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224-26 n.59 (results of conspiracy whether positive or
negative are irrelevant). See also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (where necessary effect of arrangement is plainly anticompetitive "no
elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate anticompetitive character of...
agreement").
The per se approach is the most suitable because price fixing invariably has easily observ-
able anticompetitive effects. See Note, Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason
Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706, 709 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Fixing]. Furthermore, it is more
judicially economical to apply the per se rule. But see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (weight of scholarly opinion along with dissention in courts
led Court to reexamine per se rule); Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From
White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975) (per se approach is "an exercise
in barren formalism" that is "artificial and unresponsive to the competitive needs of the
real world.").
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upon the showing of a particular class of business relationship, the
plaintiff need merely show that a conspiracy existed and that the
defendant was a participant.52 Restraints falling within this cate-
gory include horizontal price fixing, group boycotts, and tying ar-
rangements.5" However, many activities that can be classified as
restraints are not so clearly devoid of economic utility as to be per
se illegal.54 These activities must be decided under the rule of rea-
son, which requires the trier of fact to examine all the surround-
ing circumstances of a particular arrangement and determine if
the conduct inspired by the agreement has a legitimate business
purpose that outweighs its de minimis effect on competition.5 Un-
The per se rule has eroded and presently the rule of reason is the major approach of the
courts. See Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court
Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 982 (1977) (rule of reason approach is the rule and per
se approach is merely an exception).
"' See A. NEALE, ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 27-28 (2d ed. 1970); see also
Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL L. REV. 777,
796-97 n.100 (1987) (per se rule is rule of evidence designed to ease plaintiffs burden of
proof); Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The First
Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 9 (1982) (per se rule was designed for legal effi-
ciency through establishing conclusive presumptions).
5 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
"* See Cavanagh, supra note 52, at 798. In describing the rule of reason, the author
states "a large number of business practices are not so clearly devoid of competitive merit
and, hence, are not so readily susceptible to facile condemnation." Id. See also Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). In determining whether a restraint is
reasonable, "[tjhe history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopt-
ing the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts."
Id. See generally National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 687-92 (discussing rule of
reason and historical development in antitrust law).
55 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 (trier of fact must weigh all relevant factors of case to
determine if restraint is unlawful); Hayden Publishing Co. v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 730
F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1984) (under rule of reason approach, fact finder balances all circum-
stances, especially "competitive characteristics of the relevant market" in determining sta-
tus of legality); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 765 (D. Del.
1981) (must examine all the evidence to determine negative effects of restraint), aff d, 691
F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982); see also HANDLER, supra note 51, at 983 (must balance between
benefits and detriments of the questioned practice); cf. Cowley v. Braden Indus. Inc., 613
F.2d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir.) (plaintiff has burden of showing agreement is reasonable), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980). The rule of reason approach to price fixing has been praised
due to its ability to retain per se advantages such as judicial consistency in analysis, consis-
tent treatment of activities, and economic efficiency, while promoting "gains from efficient
activities and bringing greater consistency to the law." See Note, Fixing, supra note 51, at
706.
The original standards for the courts to consider in determining the legality of agree-
ments were set forth by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918). "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is as may sup-
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like the evidentiary per se rule, the rule of reason is a rule of con-
struction under which the "anticompetitive evils of a restrictive
practice must be balanced against any procompetitive benefits or
justifications within the confines of the relevant market." 6 Thus,
it is unlikely that CMAs are illegal per se, due to their diversity in
drafting and questionable provisions. However, even if they are
not inherently illegal, a rule of reason analysis may disclose signifi-
cant anticompetitive effects.
While direct horizontal price fixing" can be established by
memoranda showing agreements or arrangements among compet-
itors,58 some courts have held that noncoercive suggestions re-
garding prices, or informal agreements influencing prices, are also
illegal.59 Absent direct evidence of a price fixing agreement, an
inference of collusion to form an express price fixing agreement
can be established from the conduct of the parties."
press or even destroy competition." Id. at 238. A full analysis of the anticompetitive con-
duct must be determined prior to holding the restraint illegal. Id.
In applying the rule of reason approach, courts examine whether the restrictions on
competition are reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate business purpose. See Smith v.
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (must balance genuine business
goal against behavior which restrains competition). See also United States Trotting Ass'n v.
Chicago Downs, 665 F.2d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 1981) ("trial court must find rather than
presume harm to competition").
Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384, 1392 (5th Cir. 1983).
See Cavanagh, supra note 52, at 796-97 n.100 (if activity not illegal per se, must balance
procompetitive and anticompetitive conduct to determine legality).
" See United States v. Trenton Potteries, Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927) (seminal case
declaring direct price fixing unlawful). See also United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp.,
694 F.2d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[e]ven more egregiously contrary to vital competition
among businesses, however, is the contract allocation agreement . . . [which] eliminates not
only price competition but also competition in service and product quality."); United States
v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 297 (2d Cir.) (agreements between competing retailers
deemed per se violation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); COMPACT v. Metro. Gov't,
594 F. Supp. 1567, 1577-79 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (agreements not to bid on contracts were
per se unlawful price fixing).
" See Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 987-88 (5th Cir. 1983) (in-
ternal memoranda of defendant adequate to evidence conspiracy), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984); Wilder Enters, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1141 (4th
Cir. 1980) (conspiracy evidenced by letters soliciting bids).
" See Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 388-91 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Plymouth Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d
128, 133 (9th Cir. 1960).
" See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (conduct of
parties may establish a common commitment); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384
U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966) (same); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942)
(conscious parallelism can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the agree-
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While presently no express price fixing agreement has been es-
tablished as between bottlers who enter into CMAs, cause for con-
cern may be warranted. Where bottlers, such as Coca-Cola and
PepsiCo, enter a particular geographic market and share year-
round CMAs with retailers, the result of both brands obtaining
the highest market share and retaining the lowest-priced cola evi-
dences items from which an agreement to fix prices may be in-
ferred. However, this parallel conduct, known as "conscious paral-
lelism"'" does not in and of itself constitute an illegal agreement. 2
Further analysis of this parallel conduct must be carried on to de-
termine whether the purpose was to achieve a result contemplated
by both parties, and not merely an unintended result."a Even
though competing manufacturers independently execute their
CMAs with individual retailers, it is plausible to suggest that be-
tween manufacturers a controlling price element is tacitly ob-
served. This premise can be inferred from the actions of manufac-
ments). See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939)
("[Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate
in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is a restraint of interstate
commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.").
Indirect horizontal conspiracy can be indicated from conduct among competitors. See
Interstate Circuit, Inc., 306 U.S. at 227 (1939) ("unlawful conspiracy may be and often is
formed without simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators"); Bos-
tick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1213 (4th Cir.) ("[alntitrust civil con-
spiracy or combination has traditionally been inferred 'from a course of dealing or other
circumstances' in which the determinative facts are 'what the parties actually did' rather
than whether an express agreement existed" (quoting United States v. Parke Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1960))) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983). But see
Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954) (court
allowed evidence of parallel business conduct to be admitted as circumstantial evidence of
conspiracy, but stated it does not "conclusively" demonstrate an illegal agreement).
61 See Note, Conscious Parallelism and the Sherman Act: An Analysis and a Proposal, 30
VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1977) (defines conscious parallelism as "firms . . .conducting
their similar businesses in a uniform manner, aware that their counterparts are pursuing
the same course of action."); see Comment, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining
the Boundary, 52 U. CHL L. REV. 508, 508 (1985) ("[C]onscious parallelism" is defined as
"similar conduct by rival firms that suggests they are attempting to set prices ... for a
particular product."). When parties cannot prove "independent business reasons for engag-
ing in such practices" conduct will be considered illegal per se. Id. at 509.
2 See Theatre Enters., Inc., 346 U.S. at 540-41. See, e.g., Richards v. Neilsen Freight
Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1987) (consistency of defendants in refusal to deal is
only evidence of illegality); Transource Int'l, Inc. v. Trinity Enters., Inc., 725 F.2d 274,
281-82 (5th Cir. 1984) (defendant's refusal to deal not a conspiracy when it has plausible
business reasons).
'3 See generally Givens, Parallel Business Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 5 ANTITURtST
BULL. 273 (1960) (analyzing types of conduct necessary for conclusive inference).
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turers engaged in CMAs, such as the division of calendar weeks
between bottlers, and previous price fixing convictions.64 How-
ever, the inference that parallel action was intended by the parties
may be either rebutted or enhanced by examining evidence of al-
ternative explanations: plus factors. 6 For example, would price
fixing still be engaged in if others did not conspire in this activ-
ity?66 Are the manufacturers' prices consistently the lowest? Do
these manufacturers follow each other in market share? Could
these activities be the result of legitimate market forces?6 In large
measure, this information is not available, partially because of the
" See United States v. Allegheny Bottling, No. 87-123-N (E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file) (defendant found guilty of price fixing conspiracy); Soda
Bottler's Sales Manager Faces § I Charges, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1342,
at 818 (Nov. 26, 1987) (sales manager engaged in conspiracy to fix prices); Soda Bottlers
Plead Guilty to Price Fixing Accusations, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1337, at
633-34 (Oct. 22, 1987) (Coca-Cola bottlers plead guilty to price-fixing).
" See, e.g., Montana v. Superamerica, 559 F. Supp. 298, 302 (D. Mont. 1983) (defines
"plus factors" as "independent items of evidence which, when coupled with evidence of
conscious parallelism and a showing that the parallelism suggests collusion in that case,
tend to support a finding of collusive agreement"). Cf. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United
States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). The court stated
that " 'plus factors' . . . when standing alone and examined separately, could not be said to
point directly to the conclusion that the charges of the indictment were true beyond a
reasonable doubt, but which, when viewed as a whole, in their proper setting, spelled out
that irresistible conclusion." Id. See also Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007
(9th Cir. 1965) (conscious parallelism alone is not unlawful); Milgram v. Loew's, 192 F.2d
579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951) (additional facts must be weighed to determine if conduct is unlaw-
ful conscious parallelism), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952).
The value placed on "plus factors" and the requisite amount needed to determine that
conspiracy exists is examined on a case-by-case basis. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
371-82 (1981); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallel-
ism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 658 (1962) (with conscious parallelism addi-
tional facts always needed to find antitrust violation).
o See Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th
Cir. 1978) In order to maintain a valid cause of action plaintiff must provide evidence that
"defendants engaged in (1) consciously parallel action, (2) which was contrary to the eco-
nomic self-interest so as not to amount to a good faith business judgement." Id. See Venzie
Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d Cir. 1975) (plaintiff's
evidence must show "acts by defendants in contradiction of their own economic interests").
"? See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 336-38 (1969) (where defendants
accounted for substantial market share, agreement among themselves to exchange price
information was held to restrain competition); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940) (where agreements made as to prices, price fixing exists where
entities involved control substantial market share); Gainesville Utils. v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 573 F.2d 292, 303 (5th Cir.) ("In a concentrated market ... we believe a court
should carefully scrutinize firms to see if their conduct or any communication among them
supports or requires a finding of conspiracy"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978).
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manufacturers' refusals to comment,6" and partially because the
relevant statistical and empirical data concerning the market
structure of the soft drink industry has yet to be compiled.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that a number of court-defined
"plus factors" are apparent when considering the validity of
CMAs in the soft drink industry. The primary motivation for a
bottler to enter into a CMA is the potential increase in sales,
profit, and market share." Furthermore, it is suggested that
CMAs can accomplish these goals when used as part of an indirect
horizontal conspiracy. CMAs afford a select cartel of major bot-
tlers in a highly concentrated market 0 the ability to maintain
high profiles through secondary store displays, increase their shelf
space, achieve the lowest market prices, and increase their already
high market shares. Thus, CMAs conquer the Davids of the soft
drink industry who perish because they themselves cannot afford
to enter into the Goliaths' CMAs,7' and thus cannot profitably re-
duce their prices to within a necessary stone's throw of the
competition.7
2
Furthermore, although the consumer will temporarily gain the
benefit of low prices, this situation may rapidly change if major
bottlers are able to eliminate the competing bottlers with a
weaker economic position by forcing them from the field. If the
price charged by a bottler is reasonably calculated to pressure ri-
vals out of the market, or to substantially damage them so that the
predator can impose supracompetitive prices in the future, the act
is one of predatory pricing." In the soft drink industry, both ma-
"8 See Waldon, supra note 14, at 16 (both Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola bottling companies
refuse to comment on CMAs); 60 Minutes: Cola Payola, supra note 14, at 9 (neither Coca-
Cola nor Pepsi-Cola would agree to a 60 Minutes interview).
" See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
"0 See Carter, Yes, Antitrust Can Still Say No, FORTUNE, Sept. 1, 1986, at 64 (describes the
soda industry as already concentrated); What's Brewing for Soft Drinks in 1987, supra note
13, at 62 (soda market highly concentrated); It's Still a Free-For-All on the Soda Shelf, Bus.
WK., July 7, 1986, at 37 (same).
1 See Mason, supra note 17, at 3 ("To the little bottlers ... [tihey know they're Davids
going up against two Goliaths.").
" See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
" See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S. 350,
358 (1921); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904); see also Areeda & Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
697, 698 (1975). Predatory pricing occurs when a business entity engages in a practice of
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jor bottlers currently price above the marginal cost of the product
sold. 4 Yet, it is suggested that were major bottlers to forego
short-run profits for the purpose of driving rivals from the market
so that they could raise long-run prices, this act could be consid-
ered predatory pricing as well. If this asphyxiation of rivals oc-
curs, the major bottlers would then be left to command supra-
competitive prices." Could it not be that the controlling market
share enjoyed by Coca-Cola and PepsiCo has arisen because of an-
ticompetitive activity rather than through economic genius or
keen entrepreneurial skills? 6
lowering prices such that competitors are unable to compete and are forced to drop out of
the market. Id. Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, supra note 44, at 445 (below cost pricing
drives out competition, thereafter profits are recovered in controlled market). See generally
3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, at 148-94 (discussing marginal cost theory of
predatory pricing).
Predatory pricing has been difficult both to define and to determine when it exists. See,
e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981)
(distinguishing between predatory pricing and true to form competition is difficult), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1982); Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d
790, 797 (10th Cir.) (marginal cost was basis for determining distinction between lawful
and unlawful pricing), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Industrial Air Indus. v. American
Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 1975) (court found predatory pricing to be
"troublesome" and "never clearly defined"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). At any rate,
courts have been inclined to regard the more blatant instances of predatory pricing as
illegal under section two of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.,
348 U.S. 115, 119 (1954) (Court found predatory pricing practices included under anti-
trust theories as illegal); Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950,
954 (10th Cir. 1959) (court found practices to be within the violations of the antitrust
laws), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
' See Worthy, Coke and Pepsi Stomp on the Little Guys, FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985, at 68. (Pep-
siCo had a 1985 net profit of $203 million while Coca-Cola had a net profit of over $618
million). In order to maintain a net profit, a corporation must price above its marginal cost.
See R. Blair & D. Kaserman, supra note 43, at 125 (profit maximizing point is above margi-
nal cost). Marginal cost is the incremental cost of producing an additional unit of output.
See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 24, § 715a.
"' See Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, supra note 44, at 445. "As a consequence, the
predator allegedly gains market power and subsequently is able to raise prices to supernor-
mal levels and reap monopoly profits." See generally Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the
Long Purse, 9 J.L. & ECON. 259 (1965) (discussing price-cutting and long-run effect of in-
creased prices and high profits).
"0 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 48 (1911). In Standard Oil, the
defendants argued that their success in business was not the result of unlawful competition.
Id. Rather, they argued their success was attributed to: "economic genius of the highest
order, sustained by courage, by a keen insight into commercial situations resulting in the
acquisition of great wealth, but at the same time serving to stimulate and increase produc-
tion, to widely extend the distribution of the products . . . at a cost largely below that
which would have otherwise prevailed, thus proving to be at one and the same time a
benefaction to the general public as well as of enormous advantage to individuals." Id. But
see Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1983)
139
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 4: 121, 1988
B. Vertical Price Fixing
Vertical price fixing and resale price maintenance combinations
are terms applied synonymously to arrangements between or
among independent entities in the chain of distribution whereby,
a wholesaler and a retailer establish the retail price at which the
product will be sold.7 Similar to horizontal price-fixing, the Su-
preme Court has determined that vertical price fixing is so perni-
cious in and of itself as to be illegal per se.7 8 However, under
United States v. Colgate & Co., 79 if an entity achieves resale price
stability solely through its own actions by announcing its pricing
policy and refusing to deal with those unwilling to comply, this
(Kodak did not violate antitrust laws through use of technology to increase market share),
cert denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d
701, 712 (7th Cir.) (superior skill and efficiency which lead to increased sales is permitted),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953) (per curiam) (success achieved by technological advances is
permitted by antitrust laws), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
7 See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-09 (1911)(landmark case which held vertical price fixing illegal per se); see also ABA ANTITRUST SEC-
IoN, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 56 (2d ed. 1984). Vertical price fixing is effected
when a manufacturer agrees impliedly or explicitly with a distributor to set a price at which
the goods will be resold. Id. Shores, Vertical Price-Fixing and the Contract Conundrum: Beyond
Monsanto, 54 FORIDHAM L. REV. 377, 377-78 (1985) (violation of Sherman Act when manu-
facturer and dealer agree on resale price). There are numerous types of behavior which
have been held to be illegal vertical price-fixing. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103 (1980) (system for wine pricing which
gives wine producer power to prevent competition is illegal vertical control that "destroys
horizontal competition"); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1960)
(drug manufacturers may not combine with wholesalers to fix retailers' prices). See also
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-2 (1977) ("The market im-
pact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a simultaneous reduc-
tion of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition."). See generally
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 25-32 (outlining vertical restraint in antitrust law).
"8 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984) (price fixing
"subject to per se treatment and treble damages.") In Monsanto, the court additionally de-
clined an opportunity to consider whether vertical price restraints should be subject to the
less rigorous rule of reason. Id. at 761 n.7.
See also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1986) (per curiam) (even
though fixed prices are reasonable they are still unlawful); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968) (per se rule applies to vertical agreements aimed at establishing
maximum resale prices); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,
408 (1911) (no distinction could save complainant's plan from being condemned as illegal
price fixing). See generally Comanor, Vertical Price- Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the
New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARv. L. REV. 983 (1985) (discussing vertical price restraints and
per se violations of antitrust laws).
79 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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unilateral conduct will be upheld.80 Unilateral conduct does not
violate section one of the Sherman Act because by definition, a
"contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" requires a plurality of
actors, and a unilateral announcement of prices does not contain
the requisite collusion. 81 Therefore, should a bottler establish a
pricing policy and refuse to deal with those entities not embracing
this policy, it would be legal.8" However, some CMAs have been
found to contain express agreements between bottlers and retail-
ers as to price.
Recently, in Sun-Drop Bottling v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,83 a
United States District Court refused to enjoin Coca-Cola's 1985
CMA, but determined that its prior 1984 CMA with convenience
stores revealed per se violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act in
the form of vertical pricefixing.8" That CMA stated: "Our brands
must be the exclusive soft drinks with a reduced retail," but failed
to establish a specific price. 85 The court then held that absent a
" See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). The Colgate Court was
the first court to express the concept that, absent monopoly, unilateral conduct is not ille-
gal. Id. Thus, a private firm "may announce in advance the circumstances under which [it]
will refuse to sell." Id. The Court stated that the goal of the Sherman Act was to stop
unlawful activities which would "unduly interfere" with free trade. Id. See also Jacobson,
On Terminating Price-Cutting Distributors in Response To Competitors' Complaints, 49 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 677, 710 (1983) (fact finder should only find concerted action when certainty exists
that "supplier's decision was not independent and unilateral").
The Colgate Doctrine was later strictly construed by the courts to allow only conduct
which consisted of a manufacturer's announcement of pricing policy and a unilateral re-
fusal to deal with those who declined to adhere to it. See Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 43
(only a "simple refusal to sell to customers who will not resell at prices suggested by the
seller is permissible .... ). Use of any other conduct in attempting to set prices would be
unlawful. Id. at 44-47. The Court suggested that conduct by a manufacturer which goes
beyond merely announcing his pricing policy is apt to induce his retailers to comply unlaw-
fully. Id. at 46-47. Affirmative action taken by a firm with the goal of impelling customers
to adhere in order to eschew price competition is anticompetitive and therefore illegal. Id.
In such instances "[t]he manufacturer is thus the organizer of a price-maintenance combi-
nation or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 47; cf. Scott, R.C. Doubles
Budget Behind New Spots, ADWEEK, Nov. 16, 1987, at 22, col. 1. RC Cola filed a 53 page
document with the Federal Trade Commission requesting that CMAs be banned. Id.
" See generally E. KINrER, supra note 1, § 9.7 - .16, at 19-34.
U1 See supra note 80; Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1357 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976)
(suggested prices do not violate antitrust laws), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
u 604 F. Supp. 1197 (W.D.N.C. 1985).
" See id. at 1198-99. The reason for the denial of a preliminary injunction was the re-
moval of illegal provisions in the CMA governing prices charged. Id. Further, the court
decided that CMAs must be examined under a rule of reason test. Id. at 1199.
" Id. at 1199. This provision was subsequently removed. Id. But, it is suggested that it
remains questionable as to whether this agreed practice is still followed as to pricing.
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price element in the 1985 CMA, no per se violation existed and
thus, the request for preliminary injunction was denied. 6 It is sug-
gested that although an express agreement no longer exists, an
implied agreement by the parties may be evidenced from their
prior course of dealing.
In addition, a distributor's use of affirmative conduct to enforce
set prices has also been held illegal. This affirmative conduct con-
sists of obtaining assurances from buyers that the established price
of the manufacturer will be adhered to,88 and the use of coercion
to achieve this result. 8 Does affirmative conduct also include
agreements to provide specific shelf space for a product, promote
the product with feature ads, and display the product in prime
locations? In recent years, courts have been concerned with the
end result of promotional efforts whereby the sellers use of pro-
motional techniques interferes with the ability of retailers to
freely exercise their independent pricing decisions. 90 Perhaps
" Id. at 1200.
" See Pearl Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 945, 950, 954-55 (S.D.
Tex. 1972) (vertical price fixing can arise out of agreement or understanding between
manufacturer and distributor). See, e.g., United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85,
99-100 (1920) (when manufacturer enters into express or implied agreements it takes away
retailer's control and eliminates competition); Capital Temporaries v. Olsten Corp., 383 F.
Supp. 902, 906-09 (D. Conn. 1974) (within agreement there are statements which are im-
pliedly vertical restraints and therefore illegal).
" See 2 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 6B.02[3], at 6B-
38 (1987). One way in which suppliers enforce lawful price fixing is to "obtain[ ] assurances
from buyers that the supplier's pricing policy will be adhered to .. " Id. See, e.g., United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960) (any means employed to obtain adher-
ence to resale price violates Sherman Act); Schnapps Shop, Inc. v. H.W. Wright & Co., 377
F. Supp. 570, 577 (D. Md. 1973) (securing agreement from retailers to comply by any
means is illegal).
Since Colgate it has been generally held that a manufacturer's only means of controlling
his price is to announce his resale price and refuse to deal with those who decline to adhere
to it. But cf. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
135, 137. Professor Easterbrook suggests, however, that this doctrine has been so drasti-
cally narrowed as to become, in effect, almost useless. Id.
s' See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1968) (threat of terminating
exclusive territory arrangement if maximum retail price was exceeded deemed violative of
section one); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[c]reating a
coercive business climate" was found to be illegal price maintenance); Phillips v. Crown
Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 626-27 (4th Cir. 1979) (wholesalers controlled their
retail dealers prices illegally), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); Greene v. General Foods
Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 644 n.5 (5th Cir. 1975) (economic sanctions exerted by dealer with-
holding assistance), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976).
" See Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1972) (critical question for
fact finder is whether dealers were deprived of ability to make their own pricing decisions),
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courts should take a closer look at the promotional requirements
of CMAs.
It is suggested that CMAs have the potential to be classified as
illegal vertical price fixing agreements. Although suggestive pric-
ing by bottlers in and of itself is legal,9 ' ad features required by
CMAs specify that only a featured brand may be displayed and
discounted,9" thereby eliminating flexibility as to the grocer's pric-
ing decision.93 Thus, CMA's place the retailer's power to control
pricing4 substantially within the distributor's realm.
While it has been held that a CMA containing a vertical price
restraint is a per se antitrust violation, 95 it is submitted that a
CMA without such a pricing agreement but with vertical non-
price restraints may also be held illegal under a rule of reason
analysis. In examining the particular facts and circumstances sur-
rounding CMAs, courts must determine whether the agreement
has sufficient procompetitive justifications to outweigh its poten-
tial anticompetitive effect.
C. Group Boycott
A group boycott is an anticompetitive horizontal conspiracy be-
tween two or more competitors through which they attempt to
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973); Pearl Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp.
945, 955 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (those in position of reselling must be able to independently
determine price).
" See, e.g., Lewis Serv. Center, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 714 F.2d 842, 845 (8th Cir.
1983) (sales assistance program which reduced wholesalers prices not illegal), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1357 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976)
(manufacturer who suggests a price does not violate antitrust laws), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1074 (1977). Price maintenance agreements have been held to be legal when made under a
valid consignment agreement. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488
(1926). The Court indicated that there was no true restraint on alienation where a consign-
ment, rather than a sale, is at issue. Id. Peter v. Union Oil Co., 328 F. Supp. 998, 1005
(C.D. Cal. 1971) (voluntary consignment program not violative of antitrust laws). But cf.
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 16, 21-24 (1964) (consignment agreement held
violative of § 4 of Clayton Act, but Court distinguished case from General Elec. Co. on
grounds that in General Elec. Co. product was patented).
" See supra note 12.
" See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14-17 & 20. It is suggested that although entering into a CMA is vol-
untary, retailers have no choice due to substantial benefits derived from entering and se-
vere detriments incurred for failing to participate.
" See Sun-Drop Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 604 F. Supp. 1197, 1199
(W.D.N.C. 1985).
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drive a rival from the market by denying that rival a source of
supply or needed customers.96 The original perception of group
boycott agreements was that they were per se violative of the
Sherman Act due to their anticompetitive nature. ' However, in
recent years several courts have suggested that a rule of reason
analysis, balancing both the benefits and detriments of such con-
duct, should be examined.98 The criterion for this per se standard
was emphasized in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Sta-
tionary & Printing Co.:91 "Cases to which this Court has applied the
See Counseling Your Client on Horizontal and Vertical Restraints, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 293,
310 (1985); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 40 (2d ed. 1984)
("Horizontal agreements among suppliers refusing to deal with particular customers.... or
customers refusing to deal with particular suppliers . . . are typically referred to as con-
certed refusals to deal or 'group boycotts.' "); C. HILL, ANTITRUST ADVISOR 19 (3d ed.
1985). Group boycotts encompass "agreements among suppliers to refuse to sell to particu-
lar customers, the refusal to enter into a new business relationship or the termination of an
existing one, or a restrictive membership provision in trade association bylaws." Id. L. SUL-
LIVAN, supra note 4, § 83, at 230. A traditional boycott involves "traders at one level"
attempting to shield themselves from competition by other non-group members. Id. The
method utilized is by taking concerted action aimed at depriving the excluded wholesalers
of some [necessary] trade relationship. Id. at 230. Group boycotts may be effectuated
through inducement of a supplier or customer. Id.
In 1904 the Supreme Court first held that a concerted refusal to deal violates section one
of the Sherman Act. See Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 45-46 (1904) (manufactur-
ers and dealers formed an association whereby they agreed not to sell to nonmembers).
" See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). The Court held
the conduct of the defendant, a chain department store which induced certain national
manufacturers and distributors to discontinue selling to plaintiff, a local retail store, illegal
per se. Id. The Court recognized that "[g]roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to
deal, have long been held to be in the forbidden category." Id.
However, the Supreme Court did not explicitly refer to the term per se violation when
discussing group boycotts until 1963. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
341, 347 (1963). The court noted the actions of the "Exchange and its members would,
had it occurred in a context free from other federal regulation, constitute a per se violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. See also United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S.
127, 145 (1966) ("Elimination, by joint collaborative action of discounters from access to
the market is a per se violation of the act."); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961) (per curiam) (conspiratorial refusal to provide gas
service is group boycott and illegal).
" See Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination,
79 COLUM. L. REV., 685, 703-05 (1979) (author suggests a new analysis rather than per se).
Today several commentators and lower courts suggest that the per se rule should not apply
to group boycotts. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d
210, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The Supreme Court has now made explicit what has always
been understood . . . . [T]he per se illegality of all boycotts has now been squarely re-
jected."); United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 788 (7th
Cir. 1981) (court cautioned use of per se rule to all group boycotts).
472 U.S. 284 (1985). See also Klor's Inc. 359 U.S. at 211-12 (certain classes of dealing
are unduly restrictive and violative of antitrust policy). See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock
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per se approach have generally involved joint efforts by a firm or
firms to disadvantage competitors by 'either directly denying or
persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to deny relation-
ships the competitors need . . -' "100
Thus, an analysis of the major bottlers' use of CMAs reveals
ostensibly that bottlers contract with retailers in such a way as to
deprive competitors full and fair access to the market. As previ-
ously stated, in some regions Coca-Cola and PepsiCo enter into
consecutive twenty-six week CMAs, thus substantially depriving
smaller bottlers of needed shelf space, advertising area and cus-
tomers. It seems clear, therefore, that where such arrangements
are the result of concerted action they must be examined in terms
of group boycotts.'' This analysis will lend further credence to
the monopoly theory to be discussed presently.
D. Essential Facilities Doctrine
The essential facilities doctrine requires that competitors share
scarce facilities which cannot realistically be duplicated and which
are essential to effective competition within a given market. 02
While the boundaries of this doctrine have yet to be determined,
the four elements required for liability thereunder have been es-
tablished: (1) control of the essential facility by a business or
group of businesses; (2) the inability of a competitor to duplicate
the essential facility; (3) the denial of access to the facility by its
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963) (deprivation of valuable business service held group
boycott); Radiant Burners, Inc. 364 U.S. at 659 (refusal to provide gas held group boycott).
100 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294 (quoting L. SULLIVAN, LAWS OF AN-
TITRUST 261-62 (1977)).
.0 Cf United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966) (Court noted
"explicit agreement is not a necessary part of a Sherman Act conspiracy."); United States
v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1331 (4th Cir. 1979) ("Proof of a section one conspiracy need not
be direct"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000,
1007 (9th Cir. 1965) (no need for an express agreement to violate section one). See also 3 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, Supra note 10, § 841a, at 361-62 (1978) ("It is not necessary that
there be advance or verbally communicated agreement.")
01 See Bouknight, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing - The Conduct Standard
Under Section 2 of The Sherman Act, 6 ENERGY L. J. 275, 277 (1985) (essential facilities doc-
trine was first used when competitors were prevented from using a facility that was essen-
tial to effective competition). See generally Tye, Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry
Approach To The Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L. J. 337 (1987) (discussing economic
principles of essential facility doctrine).
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 4: 121, 1988
controller; and (4) the feasibility of the controlling business to
provide for its competitors access to the controlling facility.1"' In
the soft drink industry shelf space, because of its limited availabil-
ity and the fierce competition for it, should be deemed an essen-
tial facility.'"
CMAs give major bottlers control over shelf space as well as sec-
ondary displays used to promote their products. 15 This is because
in many instances, a retailer is under extreme economic pressure
to enter into a CMA due to the substantial monetary benefits of-
fered:106 Bottlers virtually buy control. Although smaller bottlers
103 See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 956 (1978). In order to satisfy the requirement of an essential facility "it is sufficient if
duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a
severe handicap on potential market entrants." Id. Driscoll v. City of New York, 650 F.
Supp. 1522, 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[t]he doctrine is applicable only where a party is being
denied access to something necessary for that party to engage in business which is con-
trolled by his competitors." (quoting Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 550
F. Supp. 558, 569-70 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1215 (1984))); Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International
Operations 20, 23-4 (1977) (a facility is essential if its exclusion "imposes a serious handicap
on other members of the industry"); cf. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708
F.2d 1081, 1132-3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). The court enunciated the
four elements of the essential facilities doctrine, stating as requirement number one, con-
trol by a monopolist. Id. However, in subsequent cases it was recognized that the party in
control need not always be a monopolist. See Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843,
858 (6th Cir. 1979) (upon describing the essential facilities doctrine court noted "a group
of competitors control an indispensable facility which cannot be easily duplicated"); cf. Bev-
erage Management, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144, 1156 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (no mention of monopolist as requirement). A railroad bridge has been held to be an
essential facility. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 409 (1912); see
also Otter Tail Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973) (transmission line held to be
essential facility); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520-
21 (10th Cir. 1984) (ski lift tickets held essential facility), affid on other grounds, 472 U.S.
585 (1985).
,o See Jabbonsky, Sympathy for the Retailer?, BEVERAGE WORLD, Oct. 1987, at 53 ("retail-
ers continue to charge more and more for slotting allowances and space"). See also Wil-
liams, supra note 23, at 93 (soft drink competitors fight for displays which "can increase a
product's sales sixfold.").
I05 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See also Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum at
20, Beverage Management, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (No. 1-84-1300). "Certainly Kroger decides who to run in its feature ads, but
chooses, out of economic common sense, to run the most profitable programs. Coke's
CMA program, therefore, does control this essential facility." Id.; Worthy, supra note 26,
at 68 ("[I]f Kroger ... had taken advantage of all the discounts that Coke and Pepsi bot-
tlers offered in exchange for store advertising and promotion in 1984, the retailer would
have reaped about $2 million."); 60 Minutes, supra note 14, at 8 ("[T]hey were trying to
take control of my soft drink business and I was losing control of it.").
,04 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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still retain minority shelf space, they are rapidly losing market
share as CMAs gain power and popularity.1 17 The small bottler
has neither the finances nor the ability to compete for or demand
more shelf space."" In effect, CMAs substantially foreclose small
bottlers from an essential facility: shelf space.
In order to provide better access to the essential facility, major
bottlers need only eliminate the CMA program. 09 This action
would return control over shelf space to retailers,"' and eliminate
the pressure created by the substantial monetary benefits of
CMAs.11 The result - each bottler would have equal access to
shelf space"' and the increase in competition might drive market
prices down to a more competitive level.
,07 See Scott, supra note 13, at 22. The CMA program requires that retailers give major
bottlers preferential shelf space and secondary displays as well as feature advertising. Id.
The result of these preferences is increased sales because soft drinks are high impulse
products. See Blair, supra note 13, at 60. Furthermore, it has been proven that end-of-aisle
displays increase sales over 295%. See Ellerman, Supermarkets: Opportunities for The Making,
BEVERAGE WORLD, June 1987, at 1; Wiegert, The Quest For Space, BEVERAGE WORLD, Apr.
1987, at 1. More importantly, "the bulk of packaged soft drink volume in supermarkets is
sold through off-shelf displays." Blair, supra note 13, at 58.
108 Cf. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 540 (7th Cir. 1986) (duplication of
Chicago Stadium would have been unreasonably costly); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v.
Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984) (costs and regulatory restrictions may
make duplication of facility unreasonable), affid, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); MCI Communica-
tions Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir.) ("It would not be economically feasi-
ble for MCI to duplicate Bell's local distribution facilities .... "), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891
(1983); Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 665 F. Supp. 1493, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(duplication costs deemed impracticable where they render competitor unable to compete
effectively). See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 131 (if it is not feasible for competitor to
duplicate facility, a competitor must have access on "reasonable, non-discriminatory"
terms).
Applying the essential facilities doctrine to shelf space: See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v.
FTC, 412 F.2d 605, 615 (7th Cir. 1969) ("modern grocery store has a limited amount of
shelf space .. "); E. MCCARTHY, J. GRASHOF, & A. BROGOWICZ, supra note 13, at 223 (finite
supermarket shelf space); Blair, supra note 13, at 54 (shelf space for soft drinks remains
constant); Williams, supra note 2 1, at 93 ("scarcity of shelf space has ... put the retailer in
the real estate business; manufacturers have little choice but to bid for territory to display
their wares."); Worthy, supra note 32, at 68 (bottler is afraid if shelf space is taken away he
will go out of business).
109 See 60 Minutes, supra note 14, at 9 (without CMAs the soda market would provide far
greater variety while retaining competitive prices).
110 Id.
. See supra notes 14 and 20.
11' See 60 Minutes, supra note 14.
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CONCLUSION
As the analysis in this article suggests, CMA programs instituted
by major bottlers are vulnerable to attack under various antitrust
theories. It is plausible that the social interest of free and uninhib-
ited trade among the members of our capitalistic society may be
violated by these agreements. In light of the issues raised in this
article, further analysis of CMAs is warranted to determine if the
goal of the Sherman Antitrust Act- the promotion of free com-
petition among competitors- has been violated.
Joyce M. Bowers, Michelle G. Glassberg
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